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An "Irrc-some" Issue: Does Pennsylvania's
Regulatory Review Act Violate the
Separation of Powers?
The legislative department derives a superiority in our govern-
ment from other circumstances. Its constitutional powers being
at once more extensive and less susceptible of precise limits, it
can with the greater facility, mask under complicated and




In 1982, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania adopted the
Regulatory Review Act2 ("Act") in an apparent attempt to curb
what many believed to be the proliferation of unwise bureaucratic
regulations.3 Pennsylvania, following the national trend, was one
of many states to adopt such a law.4 The Act essentially allowed
one House of the General Assembly, upon recommendation of the
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 251 (James Madison)(Gary Will ed., 1982) (discussing
the separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of govern-
ment).
2. Regulatory Review Act, Act 19 §§ 1 to 15 (1989), Senate Bill 1093 (June 21, 1989),
unofficially codified as amended at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 745.1 et seq. (1989). The
original version of the Act was passed on June 25, 1982 (P.L. 633, No. 181) with subsequent
reenactment and amendment on Feb. 21, 1986 (P.L 47, No. 16), Dec. 16, 1986 (P.L. 1625,
No. 185), and June 30, 1989 (P.L. 73, No. 19). For ease of reference, all subsequent citations
to the Act in this Comment will be to the unofficial codification.
3. See, e.g., Thorn Cole, Casey Vetoes Regulatory-Review Bill, UPI, Dec. 23, 1988,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (explaining that the Regulatory Review Act was
passed in response to alleged over-regulation).
4. In 1982, forty-two states had some provision for legislative review of state
regulations. See, eg., Iver Peterson, Courts Outlawing of Congress's Veto Casts Shadows on
State Legislatures, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1983, at A8 (discussing the influence the Supreme
Court's decision to outlaw the Congressional veto would have on similar state legislative
vetoes).
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Independent Regulatory Review Commission ("IRRC"), to prevent
the implementation of a proposed regulation.5
From the Act's inception, it was criticized as a violation of the
separation of legislative and executive powers, allowing the General
Assembly to infringe upon the Governor's constitutional duty to
"take care that the laws be faithfully executed."6 Critics argued
that the Act enabled the General Assembly to interfere unconstitu-
tionally with the Governor's rule-making authority.7
As of the early 1980s, both state and federal courts had
provided little guidance on the subject. However, in 1983, the
United States Supreme Court rendered the landmark decision of
INS v. Chadha.8  The Chadha Court held that a one-House
"legislative veto" of an executive action violated the separation of
powers doctrine.9
Subsequently, state regulatory review acts were bombarded
with court challenges to their constitutionality.1" In response, the
Pennsylvania Legislature amended the Act in 1989 to address its
potential constitutional deficiencies.1 As the Act exists today, the
General Assembly may disapprove, upon the recommendation of
the IRRC, a proposed regulation by a concurrent resolution which
is subject to the Governor's veto." The Pennsylvania courts have
yet to address whether this new procedure violates the separation
of powers between the legislative and executive branches.
This Comment will examine the separation of powers doctrine
as it applies to the Pennsylvania Regulatory Review Act. 3 In
5. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 745.5 (as originally enacted in 1982).
6. "The supreme executive power shall be vested in the Governor, who shall take care
that the laws be faithfully executed ...." PA. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
7. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 3 ("Since its establishment, the commission [i.e. IRRC]
has been criticized from almost every corner-administration officials, lawmakers and public
interest groups.").
8. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). In Chadha, one House of Congress invalidated an immigration
judge's suspension of an alien's deportation. The Supreme Court found that the House was
without constitutional authority to order a deportation. The separation of powers doctrine
prohibited Congress from interfering with the executive branch's authority over immigration
matters.
9. Id. at 959.
10. Peterson, supra note 4, at A8 (discussing the impact of Chadha on state regulatory
review measures).
11. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 745.6(b), 745.7(b) (1989).
12. Id.
13. A discussion of the effectiveness of the Regulatory Review Act in eliminating
needless or unwise regulations is beyond the scope of this Comment. The analysis is limited
to the relationship between the Regulatory Review Act and the separation of powers
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particular, this Comment will address the 1989 amendments to the
Act and whether the amendments cured the constitutional
deficiencies found in the original Act.
Part II explores the philosophy of the separation of powers
doctrine and how the courts have applied it. Part III explains the
regulatory review procedure presently set forth in the Act,
including the composition of the IRRC. Part IV addresses the
implications of Department of Environmental Resources v. Jubel-
ier,14 the case in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court came the
closest to addressing the constitutionality of the Act. Part V asserts
that the Act in its current form violates the separation of powers
doctrine and is therefore unconstitutional under the Pennsylvania
Constitution. Part VI examines why the constitutionality of the Act
has not been challenged since Jubelier.15 Finally, Part VII discuss-
es the possible consequences of finding the Act to be unconstitu-
tional.
II. The Philosophy And Court Treatment Of The Separation
Of Powers Doctrine
The doctrine of separation of powers is an integral part of our
state and federal governments.16 The division of power between
the legislative, executive and judicial branches serves a more
grandiose purpose than simply the efficient administration of
government. A cursory glance at the philosophy of the separation
of powers reveals that the purpose is nothing less than the
protection of liberty, whether from an imminent threat or a
potential future threat.17
A discussion on the modem notion of separation of powers
necessarily begins with the writings of French philosopher Montes-
quieu.18 In The Spirit of Laws, Montesquieu observed that where
doctrine.
14. 567 A.2d 741 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989), vacated, 614 A.2d 204 (Pa. 1992).
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., infra notes 19-29. Both Montesquieu and the writers of the Federalist
Papers place tremendous importance upon the separation of powers doctrine. Id.
17. Id.
18. Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de la Brede et de Montesquieu was born in
France and lived from 1689-1755. He is best known for his theory of the separation of
powers. The theory was largely developed from his observations of the government of
England. The preservation of liberty, thought Montesquieu, was dependent upon the
separation of the executive, legislative and judicial branches. All other types of government
necessarily led to despotism. See WILLIAM EBENSTEIN & ALAN 0. EBENSTEIN, GREAT
1997]
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the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person
or body, "there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise,
lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to
execute them in a tyrannical manner."19 He believed that if the
executive was unable to restrain legislative encroachments on
executive authority, the legislature would become "despotic,"
"arrogate to itself what authority it pleased," and eventually
destroy all other powers.' ° In fact, Montesquieu went so far as to
refer to the executive as a "sacred" position that must be protected
from the legislature.2'
Montesquieu's fears were shared by the Framers of the
Constitution of the United States.' Accordingly, the Framers
delineated, in a specific fashion, the powers granted to each of the
three branches of government.' Observing that the "legislative
department is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity, and
drawing all power into its impetuous vortex," James Madison, in
The Federalist No. 48, warned against legislative usurpations "which
by assembling all power in the same hands, must lead to the same
tyranny as is threatened by executive usurpations."" Similar
sentiments concerning legislative power were shared by Thomas
Jefferson: "It will be no alleviation [from despotic government]
that these [government] powers will be exercised by a plurality of
hands, and not by a single one, 173 despots would surely be as
oppressive as one."' Even though the Framers recognized that
in a republican government the legislative authority predomi-
POLITICAL THINKERS: PLATO To THE PRESENT 456-59 (5th ed. 1990).
19. MoNTESQuiEu, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 70 (Robert M. Hutchins ed. & Thomas
Nugent et al. trans., 1971) (1st ed. 1748).
20. Id. at 72.
21. "His [the executive's] person should be sacred, because as it is necessary for the
good of the state to prevent the legislative body from rendering themselves arbitrary ... 
i at 73.
22. See, e.g., EBENSTEIN & EBENSTEIN, supra note 18, at 459; see also THE FEDERALIST
NO. 47 (James Madison) (quoting Montesquieu).
23. See U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, III (providing respectively for the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches of the United States government).
24. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 250-51 (James Madison).
25. Id. at 252 (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
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nates,2 they adamantly asserted that legislative authority must be
carefully contained in order to secure the blessings of liberty.
27
Both state and federal courts have heavily relied upon the
philosophies of Montesquieu and the Framers in drafting their
separation of powers opinions.' The United States Supreme
Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court have both found the
separation of powers to be a fundamental principle of their
respective governments." Additionally, the Chadha Court
explained that even if a law or procedure is "efficient, convenient,
and useful in facilitating functions of government," it may not
violate the constitutional guarantee of the separation of powers.3 °
Federal courts have strictly adhered to the provisions of the
Constitution when analyzing separation of powers questions."
This formalistic approach is founded upon the belief that the
Framers structured the Constitution with certain institutional
safeguards. If adhered to strictly, the safeguards would secure the
separation of powers which in turn would protect the liberties of
the citizenry. For instance, the United States Constitution requires
two basic components for legislative action: (1) passage through
both Houses of Congress, and (2) presentment to the President.32
In Chadha, Congress failed to satisfy the bicameral and present-
ment requirements of the Constitution-and thus violated the
26. See THE FEDERAUST No. 51, at 263 (James Madison) ("But it is not possible to give
to each department an equal power of self defence. In republican government the legislative
authority, necessarily, predominates.").
27. See id at 263-64 ("In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people, is
submitted to the administration of a single government; and usurpations are guarded against
by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments.").
28. See, eg., Bowser v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986) ("Even a cursory examination
of the Constitution reveals the influence of Montesquieu's thesis that checks and balances
were the foundation of a structure of government that would protect liberty.").
29. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120 (1976) ("Our inquiry of necessity touches upon
the fundamental principles of the Government established by the Framers of the
Constitution, and all litigants and all of the courts which have addressed themselves to the
matter start on common ground in the recognition of the intent of the Framers that the
powers of the three great branches of the National Government be largely separate from one
another."). See also Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 532 A.2d 775, 778 (Pa. 1987).
30. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983).
31. See generally Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63
TEx. L. REv. 207 (1984) (discussing the Supreme Court's "formalistic" approach to
separation of powers questions).
32. "Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and Senate, shall,
before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States ...." U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 7.
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separation of powers doctrine -by allowing one House to veto the
actions of the Attorney General (an executive agent).3
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has adopted the Chadha
formalistic approach.3 ' However, the Pennsylvania constitutional
requirements for legislative action are stricter than the require-
ments found in the United States Constitution.35
III. The Pennsylvania Regulatory Review Procedure
Three fundamental sections of the current Pennsylvania
Regulatory Review Act are relevant to this Comment. 36  First,
section 745.4 provides for the creation of the Independent Regula-
tory Review Commission ("IRRC"), the entity responsible for the
oversight of proposed regulations.37  The IRRC consists of five
"commissioners., 38  Each of the following persons appoints one
commissioner to the IRRC: the Governor, the President pro
tempore of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives, the Minority Leader of the Senate, and the Minority Leader
of the House of Representatives. 39 The Governor may, with the
approval of two-thirds of the Senate, remove a commissioner for
misfeasance, malfeasance or neglect of duty.'
Second, section 745.6 sets forth the procedures for IRRC
consideration of proposed regulations. 41 If a proposed regulation
is determined to be contrary to public interest, as adjudged by
specified criteria,42 the IRRC may, under subsection 745.6(b),
33. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959.
34. Sessoms, 532 A.2d at 778 (stating that bicameral approval and presentment to the
Governor are integral parts of the constitutional design for the separation of powers).
35. See PA. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-4; Sessorms, 532 A.2d at 778 (explaining that the
Pennsylvania Constitution contains explicit strictures concerning legislative procedure that
are not contained in the United States Constitution). See also infra Part V.
36. Section 745.2 of the Regulatory Review Act states that regulatory oversight is the
legislative intent. However, section 745.2 is not relevant for purposes of this Comment
because the separation of powers analysis hinges solely on whether the Act adheres to the
legislative procedure set forth in the Pennsylvania Constitution, regardless of legislative
intent. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 745.2.
37. Id. § 745.4.
38. Id. § 745.4(a).
39. I
40. Id. § 745.4(e).
41. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 745.6.
42. Factors to be considered by the IRRC when adjudging a proposed regulation include
the following: (1) the statutory authority of the agency; (2) the legislative intent in the
enactment of the statute upon which the final-form regulation is based; (3) the economic or
fiscal impacts of the regulation or rule; (4) the protection of the public health, safety and
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issue an order barring the publication of a final order adopting the
regulation.43 The promulgating agency however has an opportun-
ity under section 745.7 to challenge the IRRC rejection."
Third, section 745.7 provides for the subsequent review of a
rejected regulation.45 The following is a summary of the proce-
dure for subsequent review of a proposed regulation. If the agency
desires to implement a rejected regulation without revisions or
modifications, the agency must notify the Governor, the designated
standing committees of the House and Senate, and the IRRC of its
intention to proceed.' Along with its notification, the agency
must submit a report containing the proposed regulation, the
findings of the IRRC, and the agency's response to the IRRC's
objections.
47
The designated standing committees of the House and Senate
have the option of approving or disapproving the proposed
regulation." If one or both of the designated standing committees
disapprove of the proposed regulation, the committee may report
a concurrent resolution to the House and Senate concerning the
rejection of the proposed regulation 9.4  Nonetheless, if the desig-
nated standing committees approve of the proposed regulation, the
IRRC has the opportunity to either approve the regulation or
continue its bar. If the bar is continued, the committees must
report a concurrent resolution to the House and Senate concerning
the rejection of the proposed resolution. °
If a concurrent resolution rejecting the proposed regulation
fails to obtain a majority in either the House or Senate, the agency
may proceed with implementation of the regulation." If a
concurrent resolution rejecting the proposed regulation is agreed to
by a majority in both the House and Senate, the resolution is
welfare, and the effect on the Commonwealth's natural resources; (5) the clarity, feasibility
and reasonableness of the regulation; (6) whether the regulation represents a policy decision
of such a substantial nature that it requires legislative review; and (7) the approval or
disapproval by the designated standing committee of the House of Representatives or the
Senate. Id. § 745.5(e).
43. Id. § 745.6(b).
44. Id. § 745.7.
45. Id.
46. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 745.7(a).
47. Id. § 745.7(b).
48. Id. §§ 745.7(b), 745.7(c).
49. Id. § 745.7(b).
50. Id. § 745.7(c).
51. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 745.7(d).
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presented to the Governor pursuant to Article III, Section 9 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution.52 If the Governor fails to veto the
resolution, implementation of the proposed regulation is perma-
nently barred.53 If the Governor vetoes the resolution, the agency
could implement the regulation, provided that the veto is not
overridden by a two-thirds vote in each House, in which case the
agency would be permanently barred from implementing the
regulation.'
IV. Department of Environmental Resources v. Jubelier
The closest Pennsylvania courts have come to addressing the
question of whether the Regulatory Review Act violates the
separation of legislative and executive powers is Department of
Environment Resources v. Jubelier.55 The Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of Environmental Resources (DER) sought to have the Act,
as it stood before the 1989 amendments, declared unconstitutional.
The DER brought the action after the IRRC and the Senate
Environmental Resources and Energy Committee barred the
implementation of a regulation providing for volatility limitations
on gasoline sold or exchanged in the Commonwealth. 6
In 1989, after the 1989 amendments had been adopted, 7 the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania held that the DER had
standing to bring suit;" that the action was not rendered moot by
the 1989 amendments;5 9 and that the Act-as it stood prior to the
1989 amendments-was unconstitutional as a violation of the
separation of powers.'
Relying on Commonwealth v. Sessoms,61 in which the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court found the composition of the Pennsylvania
Commission on Sentencing to be the most significant factor in
determining its status as a legislative agent, the Commonwealth
52. Id § 745.7(d).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 567 A.2d 741 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989), vacated, 614 A.2d 204 (Pa. 1992).
56. Id.
57. The 1989 amendments to the Regulatory Review Act were adopted on June 30 of
that year. Jubelier was not decided until Dec. 7, 1989.
58. Jubelier, 567 A.2d at 746-47.
59. Id at 746-47.
60. Id. at 748-49.
61. 532 A.2d 775 (Pa. 1987).
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Court found the IRRC to be a legislative agent.62 The General
Assembly appointed four of the five IRRC commissioners.' Even
though the Governor had the power to remove commissioners, the
power was limited to circumstances of misfeasance and malfeasance
and could only be exercised with the consent of two-thirds of the
Senate."4 The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania went on to
explain, as had the earlier Sessoms court,' that the powers of
investigation, classification and evaluation were functions tradition-
ally undertaken by committees of the House and Senate.' This
provided further indication of the IRRC's legislative nature. The
Commonwealth Court also found that the stated legislative intent
of the Act67-to provide oversight of the regulatory pro-
cess-demonstrated that the IRRC was a legislative agent.'
Having assessed the IRRC to be a legislative agent, the
Commonwealth Court then considered whether the original Act
unconstitutionally interfered with the executive branch's rule-
making authority. Applying a formalistic approach to the separa-
tion of powers question, the court opined that nothing less than
legislation could be used to override or interfere with the executive
branch's rule-making authority.69 Accordingly, the court held that
the provisions enabling the IRRC to block publication of a
regulation (subsections 745.6(b) and 745.7(b))7 ° were an unconsti-
tutional "impediment to the executive's rule-making authority
inherent in his duty to administer the laws."71
Moreover, the Commonwealth Court found that allowing one
standing committee to permanently disapprove a proposed
regulation violated the bicameral action and gubernatorial
presentment requirements of Article III, Section 9 of the Pennsyl-
62. Jubelier, 567 A.2d at 748.
63. Id.; see also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 745.4.
64. Jubelier, 567 A.2d at 748 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989); see also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71,
§ 745.4.
65. Sessoms, 532 A.2d at 780.
66. Jubelier, 567 A.2d at 748 ("Oversight and review-much like the investigatory and
evaluation functions of the sentencing commission in Sessoms-are legislative functions.").
67. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 745.2.
68. Jubelier, 567 A.2d at 749 ("IRRC, a body created to assist the General Assembly
and empowered to perform preliminary oversight functions, is an agent of the legislature.").
69. Id. (quoting Bowser v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,733-34 (1986) ("[O]nce Congress makes
its choice in enacting legislation, its participation ends. Congress can thereafter control the
execution of its enactment only indirectly-by passing new legislation.")).
70. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 745.6(b), 745.7(b) (prior to 1989 amendments).
71. Jubelier, 567 A.2d at 749.
1997]
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vania Constitution.72 Accordingly, the court held subsection
745.7(b) of the old Act to be unconstitutional.73
On appeal in 1992, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated
the Commonwealth Court's decision in Jubelier.7 4  The court
found that the 1989 amendments to the Act rendered the contro-
versy moot when the Commonwealth Court heard argument." If
DER wanted to pursue the implementation of the regulation, the
court reasoned, it should have resubmitted it under the amended
Act.76 Because no action was taken under the new procedure, the
Supreme Court refused outright to consider the topic that this
Comment addresses: Whether the amended Act violates the
separation of powers doctrine.77
V. Legislative Tyranny?: A Critical Analysis Of The 1989
Amendments To The Regulatory Review Act
The 1989 amendments were an obvious attempt to cure the
constitutional deficiencies of the Act. The amendments came in
the wake of Chadha78 and a plethora of similar decisions in
various state courts.79 In response to these cases, the amendments
simply replaced the provisions allowing a one-House committee
rejection of a proposed regulation." Under the 1989 amend-
ments, a concurrent resolution, passed in both Houses and subject
72. Id.; see also PA. CONsT. art III, § 9 ("Every order, resolution or vote, to which the
concurrence of both Houses may be necessary, except on the question of adjournment, shall
be presented to the Governor and before it shall take effect be approved by him, or being
disapproved, shall be repassed by two-thirds of both Houses according to the rules and
limitations prescribed in case of a bill.").
73. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 745.7(b).
74. Deptartment of Envtl. Resources v. Jubelier, 614 A.2d 204 (Pa. 1992) (vacating
Jubelier, 567 A.2d 741).
75. Id. at 210-11.
76. Id. at 211 n.3, 212 ("We will not review the New Act because none of the parties
have undertaken any of its procedures.").
77. Id.
78. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
79. For a thorough coverage of legislative regulatory review procedures in other states,
see Dan R. Stengle & James P. Rhea, Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Legislative
Struggle to Contain Rulemaking by Executive Agencies, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415 (1993);
see also State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1980); State ex rel. Barker v.
Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1981); Opinion of the Justices, 431 A.2d 783 (N.H. 1981);
General Assembly of N.J. v. Byrne, 448 A.2d 438 (N.J. 1982); Enourato v. N.J. Bldg. Auth.,
448 A.2d 449 (N.J. 1982); Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky.
1984); State ex rel. Stephan v. Kan. House of Representatives, 687 P.2d 622 (Kan. 1984);
Mead v. Arnell, 791 P.2d 410 (Idaho 1990).
80. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 745.6(b), 745.7(b) (as originally enacted in 1982).
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to the Governor's veto, became necessary for the rejection of a
proposed regulation."1 All other provisions of the Act relevant to
the issue of the separation of legislative and executive power
remained largely unchanged.'
A. IRRC Remains a Legislative Agent with the Ability to
Interfere with the Executive Branch's Rule-Making Authority
The 1989 amendments did not change the fundamental
composition and purpose of the IRRC. Under subsection 745.4(a)
of the amended Act, four of the five IRRC commissioners are still
appointed by the legislature.83 Under subsection 745.4(e), guber-
natorial removal of a commissioner for misfeasance, malfeasance
or neglect of duty can still be done only with the approval of two-
thirds of the Senate.' The stated legislative intent of the Act is
still the oversight of the regulatory process.8 5 In addition, the
functions performed by the IRRC (e.g. investigation, classification
and evaluation) are still traditionally functions performed by
legislative committees.8 6 These are the same factors that the
Commonwealth Court took into consideration in Jubelier when it
held that the IRRC was a legislative agent.' Although the
Supreme Court vacated the judgment on other grounds,' the
Commonwealth Court advanced a very strong argument that the
IRRC was in fact a legislative agent acting in the interests of the
General Assembly. 9 Along the same lines, the United States
Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo9° held that the Federal
Elections Commission was a legislative agent because four of the
81. Id §§ 745.6(b), 745.7(b) (after 1989 amendments).
82. See, e.g., id § 745.4(a) (providing for appointments to IRRC), § 745.5 (setting forth
procedure for submission of proposed regulation to IRRC and the designated standing
committees).
83. Id. § 745.4(a).
84. Id. § 745.4(e).
85. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 745.2.
86. Commwealth v. Sessoms, 532 A.2d 775, 780 (Pa. 1987) (referring to investigation,
classification, and evaluation as traditional functions of legislative committees).
87. See Department of Envtl. Resources v. Jubelier, 567 A.2d 74i, 749 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1989), vacated, 614 A.2d 204 (Pa. 1992).
88. See Jubelier, 614 A.2d at 210-11.
89. See Jubelier, 567 A.2d at 748-49.
90. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Buckley involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the
Federal Election Campaign Act by various individuals and groups. Besides the separation
of powers challenge, the Act was primarily attacked as a violation of the First Amendment's
speech and association rights as well as the Fifth Amendment's equal protection principles.
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six members were appointed by Congressional leaders and the
Commission exercised functions traditionally associated with a
legislative committee."
Once it is established that the IRRC is a legislative agent, the
next inquiry is whether the IRRC unconstitutionally interferes with
the executive branch's rule-making authority. As Montesquieu and
the Framer's suggested,92 even the slightest encroachments by the
legislature upon the power of the executive branch should be
viewed with a skeptical eye. Nonetheless, as the United States
Supreme Court pointed out in Buckley, "it is also clear from the
provisions of the Constitution itself, and from the Federalist Papers,
that the Constitution by no means contemplates total separation of
each of these three essential branches of Government."93  The
Buckley Court, however, went on to state: "It is to the President,
and not to the Congress, that the Constitution entrusts the
responsibility to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed.' 94
For the reasons that follow, the IRRC's interference in the rule-
making process exceeds acceptable levels of intermingling between
the branches and, thus, offends the constitutional guarantee of the
separation of powers.
1. IRRC's Ability to Delay Implementation of Regula-
tions. -In Legislative Research Commission v. Brown95 the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court found that the Kentucky Legislative Research
Commission's ability to delay the implementation of regulations
was in essence the same as a legislative veto and therefore
unconstitutional.96 The Pennsylvania IRRC suffers the same
constitutional deficiency. Although the IRRC lacks the ability to
permanently bar the implementation of a regulation, the IRRC
does have the power to independently delay the implementation of
a proposed regulation for an extensive period of time.97 As the
91. Id. at 113.
92. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison) (quoting Montesquieu).
93. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 104.
94. Id. at 138.
95. 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984).
96. Id at 918.
97. Under the Regulatory Review Act, the IRRC could cause a delay in the
implementation of a regulation that could potentially last up to 180 days: thirty days for the
initial rejection of the regulation by the IRRC, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 745.5; up to forty
days for the agency to resubmit the regulation along with a report, id. § 745.7; thirty days for
the consideration of a concurrent resolution by the Legislature, id; ten days for the
Governor to veto the concurrent resolution, id.; thirty days for the Legislature to override
[Vol. 101:3
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Brown court explained, such an ability has "the effect of creating
a legislative veto of the administrative policy of the executive
branch of government."98 Although the Pennsylvania Act pro-
vides an exception allowing immediate implementation of a
regulation in cases of emergencies and compliance with a federal
statute, the exception is limited to 120 days; after which time, the
IRRC may disapprove of the regulation."
The power to delay implementation of a regulation acts as a
de facto veto of the regulation. For instance, if the implementing
agency believes that a regulation is necessary to meet a pending
problem within the Commonwealth, the agency would likely
abandon the old proposed regulation and settle for another
regulation that will be able to pass the IRRC standards without
delay. The power of the IRRC in such a situation undeniably
places executive agencies in a vulnerable position.
Similarly, the very existence of the IRRC necessarily shapes
the way in which agencies design their regulations. The drafting of
regulations is likely affected not only by what the agency believes
to be the best policy for the Commonwealth, but also by what the
agency believes will not be barred from implementation by the
IRRC (i.e., the legislative branch). Accordingly, the executive
branch's ability to draft a coherent regulatory scheme is severely
limited by the very existence of the IRRC.
2. The Influence of Individuals and Special Interests on
IRRC. -One of the primary reasons the Framers separated
powers between three branches of government was to limit the
ability of individuals and factions, whether internal or external, to
have undue influence over the affairs of government. As Madison,
referring to the necessity of an executive veto, aptly noted in The
Federalist No. 73: "The propriety of the thing does not turn upon
the supposition of the superior wisdom or virtue in the executive:
But upon the supposition that the legislative will not be infallible
... that a spirit of faction may sometimes pervert its delibera-
tions.""° When the laws are made and executed by one branch,
special interests need only convince that single branch of the merits
the Governor's veto, id.
98. Brown, 664 S.W.2d at 918.
99. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 745.6(b).
100. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 373 (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
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of their contentions in order to achieve their desires. Such is the
case with the IRRC.
Traditionally, the President pro tempore of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House, the Senate Minority Leader and the House
Minority Leader are lobbied very heavily by special interest groups.
Ironically, these same four individuals appoint four of the five
IRRC commissioners. 1 ' In other words, lobbyists in reality need
to lobby only four individuals and their appointed agents in order
to have a substantial impact upon both the making of a law as well
as its execution. Despite its name, the IRRC is by no means
"independent." It is well known that special interests lobby IRRC
in order to influence decisions concerning which regulations are
challenged."°
3. The Ability of Subsequent General Assemblies to Frustrate
Original Legislative Intent Without Legislating Anew. -The
procedure allowed for under the Act empowers the current
General Assembly to disregard the intent of the General Assembly
that originally enacted the enabling law from which a proposed
regulation has arisen. Even if an agency's proposed regulation is
in full compliance with the original intent of the law, the current
General Assembly could by concurrent resolution strike down the
proposed regulation. Such an ability constitutes an unlawful
interference with power lawfully delegated to the executive branch.
In essence, the Act vests the General Assembly with the ability to
amend and interpret the law by way of a concurrent resolution. As
will be discussed, the procedure for passing a concurrent resolution
is relaxed in comparison to the constitutionally mandated proce-
dure for lawmaking.
This scenario demonstrates precisely the type of situation
against which the Framers and Montesquieu had warned.1 3 The
checks and balances upon the powers of the General Assembly
have been weakened by the Act and the existence of IRRC. The
derogation of the separation of powers has led to a situation in
which one branch has the potential to effectively exercise tyranny,
however mildly, over the citizenry of the Commonwealth.
101. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 745.4(a).
102. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 3. Governor Casey asserted that "[tihe reality is (that)
too often the interests being served by excessive delays are special interests which lobby
IRRC so effectively rather than the interests of the public at large." Id.
103. See generally, supra notes 19-29.
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B. Regulatory Oversight Must Be Accomplished by Adhering to
Constitutionally Mandated Legislative Procedure
The fundamental change brought about by the 1989 amend-
ments to the Act was the replacement of the one-House committee
veto requirement with the Article III, Section 9 concurrent
resolution requirement."° It is a well-established principle that
a legislative body may either legislate in detail or legislate in
general and delegate power to the executive branch to fill in the
details. 5 In Bowser v. Synar, °6 the United States Supreme
Court stated that "[o]nce Congress makes its choice in enacting
legislation, its participation ends. Congress can thereafter control
the execution of its enactment only indirectly-by passing new
legislation."' "°7  A few years earlier in Chadha, the Court ex-
plained that two fundamental concepts are "integral parts of the
constitutional design for the separation of powers.' '""2
[T]he bicameral requirement and the Presentment Clause
... serve essential constitutional functions. The [Executive's]
participation in the legislative process was to protect the
Executive Branch from [the legislature] and to protect the
whole people from improvident laws. The division of [the
legislature] into two distinctive bodies assures that the legisla-
tive power would be exercised only after opportunity for full
study and debate in separate settings. The [Executive's]
unilateral veto power, in turn, was limited by the power of two-
thirds of both Houses... to overrule a veto thereby precluding
final arbitrary action of one person .... It emerges clearly that
the prescription for legislative action ... represents the
Framer's decision that the legislative power. . . be exercised in
accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively consid-
ered, procedure.1 °9
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the Chadha reasoning
in Sessoms."' Interestingly, the Sessoms court did not explicate
104. See PA. CONsT. art III, § 9; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 745.7(b).
105. See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825).
106. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
107. Id. at 733-34.
108. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946 (1983).
109. Id. at 951.
110. Commonwealth. v. Sessoms, 532 A.2d 775, 778-79 (Pa. 1987).
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whether the full legislative procedure"' is required for legislative
action affecting rule-making or whether a concurrent resolution
subject to the Governor's veto"' is sufficient for such a purpose.
It is this distinction that places the Act in controversy.
As it presently stands, the Act requires the passage of a
concurrent resolution by a majority of both Houses-subject to the
Governor's veto-for the barring of a proposed regulation. 1"
Although this procedure satisfies the Sessoms bicameral and
presentment requirements,"4 it falls far short of meeting the
requirements for the passage of legislation.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Scudder v. Smith"5 held
that a joint resolution, which always begins with the words "Be it
resolved... ," was not a law despite its adoption by both Houses
and its presentment to the Governor."6 The Scudder court
defined a resolution as merely a formal expression of the opinion
or will of an official body or a public assembly.11 7 A resolution
differs significantly from a law, which can only be passed by a
bill . 8 As the Supreme Court explained:
The fact that a joint resolution went through the mode of
passage prescribed by the Constitution for Bills, does not supply
the constitutional deficiencies of its conception. The purpose of
the constitutional requirements relating to the enactment of
laws was to put the members of the Assembly and others
interested, on notice, by the title of the measure submitted, so
that they might vote on it with circumspection. What was
attempted to be done by the sponsors of this challenged
measure was something utterly alien to the proper subject
matter of a "joint resolution." Its deceptive nomenclature is
fatal to its validity as a law."9
For similar reasons, the concurrent resolution provided for in
the Act cannot properly be considered legislation."2 The concur-
111. See PA. CONST. art. IV, § 15.
112. See PA. CONsT. art. III, § 9.
113. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 745.7(b).
114. See Sessoms, 532 A.2d at 778-79.
115. 200 A. 601 (Pa. 1938) (challenge to a resolution that gave a commission inquisitorial
power to investigate the oil industry in the state).
116. Id.
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rent resolution does not put legislators and the public on notice
that the measure will have the effect of law. As a general
principle, legislators typically do not take resolutions as seriously
as actual bills. Accordingly, it can be deduced that most legislators
will not research the contents of a concurrent resolution barring a
proposed regulation as thoroughly as they would a regular bill.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in West Shore School District
v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board... clarified the status of an
Article III, Section 9 concurrent resolution: "[A] concurrent
resolution signed by the Governor has the effect of law, although,
the resolution in and of itself is not a law as contemplated under
Article 3, Section 1. Resolutions do not attempt to promulgate
rules or create rights but merely enhance those which already
exist."'" Although the General Assembly is not in the literal
sense promulgating rules, it is in fact controlling which rules can be
promulgated. Such a power is in essence the equivalent of
promulgating rules, and therefore cannot be constitutionally
accomplished by way of a concurrent resolution.
The Act allows the Pennsylvania General Assembly to
circumvent the procedural safeguards built into the Pennsylvania
Constitution to protect the separation of powers. The passage of
a concurrent resolution is much easier than the passage of a bill.
Thus, it is easier to interfere with the executive branch's rule-
making authority.
The constitutionally mandated procedure for the passage of a
law in Pennsylvania is wrought with safeguards designed to keep
the General Assembly's power in check. For example, the purpose
of bills may not be substantively changed on their passage through
the Houses."2 All bills must be considered in committee. 24
All bills are limited to only one subject clearly identified in the
bill's title.125 All bills must be considered on three different days
121. 626 A.2d 1131 (Pa. 1993) (holding that the state Sunset Act which enabled the
Legislature to reestablish an agency by resolution violated the state constitution).
122. Id. at 1135.
123. PA. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("No law shall be passed except by bill, and no bill shall be
so altered or amended, on its passage through either House, as to change its original
purpose.").
124. Id. art. III, § 2 ("No bill shall be considered unless referred to a committee, printed
for the use of the members and returned therefrom.").
125. Id. art. III, § 3 ("No bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, which
shall be clearly expressed in its title, except a general appropriation bill or a bill codifying
or compiling the law or a part thereof.").
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in each House.126 Finally, all bills are subject to the Governor's
veto."r With the exception of committee consideration and the
Governor's veto, the General Assembly could avoid these proce-
dural safeguards under the current Act. These safeguards are
essential to protecting the executive branch from spontaneous,
imprudent action by the General Assembly. Subsection 745.7(b) of
the Act should accordingly be modified to require the General
Assembly to follow the constitutionally mandated lawmaking
procedure when denying the implementation of a proposed
regulation.
VI. Probable Reasons Why The Regulatory Review Act Has
Not Been Challenged
The constitutionality of the Act has likely not been challenged
for three primary reasons. First, the Jubelier case was decided in
19 92 .1"8 It will probably take a few years before an appropriate
case or controversy arises.
Second, in January of 1995, Governor Robert Casey, an
adamant opponent of the Act,129 was succeeded by Governor
Thomas Ridge. The new Governor has yet to make known his
sentiments towards the Act.
126. Id. art. IV, § 4.
Every bill shall be considered on three different days in each House. All
amendments made thereto shall be printed for the use of the members before the
final vote is taken on the bill and before the final vote is taken, upon written
request addressed to the presiding officer of either House by at least 25% of the
members elected to that House, any bill shall be read at length in that House. No
bill shall become a law, unless on its final passage the vote is taken by yeas and
nays, the names of the persons voting for and against it are entered on the journal,
and a majority of the members elected to each House is recorded thereon as
voting in its favor.
Id.
127. Id. art. IV, § 15 ("Every bill which shall have passed both Houses shall be presented
to the Governor ... ").
128. See Department of Envtl. Resources v. Jubelier, 614 A.2d 204 (Pa. 1992), vacating,
567 A.2d 741 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989). The exact date of the decision was September 16,
1992.
129. See Cole, supra note 3. Casey believed that the court system was the proper avenue
for special interest groups to challenge the way the executive branch implemented laws. Id.
Casey stated that the regulatory review process "becomes intolerable when it comes so
intrusive into executive decision-making that discretion is effectively removed from
department heads or their priorities are effective [sic] frustrated by excessive delays and
bureaucratic hurdles built into the review process." Id. Casey also expressed frustration
with the influence of lobbyists over IRRC. Id.
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The third, and probably most prominent, reason why the Act
has not been challenged is that few parties have standing to
challenge the Act. In Jubelier, the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania found that the Department of Environmental
Resources, as a executive agent, had standing to bring suit against
the General Assembly."' In a suit brought simultaneously, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied standing to a private environ-
mental organization."' 1 The court held that "in order to have
standing, a party must have an interest in the controversy that is
distinguishable from the interest shared by other citizens. To
surpass that common interest, the interest must be substantial,
direct and immediate."' 32  Accordingly, few parties, outside
agents of the executive branch, have standing to challenge the Act.
VII. Possible Consequences If The Act Is Found To Be
Unconstitutional
Three obvious consequences are likely if the Act is found to
be unconstitutional. First, the promulgation of the regulations by
the executive branch will once again go unchecked by the General
Assembly. Freed from these constraints, agencies may implement
the regulations that they were previously unable to implement.
Nonetheless, the General Assembly could reestablish the regulatory
review procedure by reinstituting the Act in an amended form
which mitigates the constitutional deficiencies.
Second, the constitutionality of other "independent" agencies,
such as the Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Association
(PHEAA) and the State Ethics Commission, would be thrown into
question. Both PHEAA and the Ethics Commission are run by
Boards that consist of large numbers of General Assembly
appointments.3 3  If PHEAA and the Ethics Commission are
130. See Jubelier, 567 A.2d at 746; see also Leonard v. Thornburgh, 467 A.2d 104 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1983); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
131. See Sierra Club v. Hartman, 605 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1992), affg 567 A.2d 339 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1989) (holding that private environmental organization lacked standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the Regulatory Review Act).
132. Id. at 310 (citing Sprague v. Casey, 550 A.2d 184 (1988)).
133. The State Ethics Commission consists of seven members. Three are appointed by
the Governor. Each of the following appoints one member: the President pro tempore of
the Senate, the Minority Leader of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, and the Minority
Leader of the House. See 65 PA. CONS. STAT. § 406 (1995).
The PHEAA Board of Directors consists of nineteen appointees. Three are appointed
by the Governor. Eight are appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate. Eight
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found to be legislative agents, then their ability to undertake
executive functions would be questionable.
Finally, the General Assembly would be forced to take greater
care in drafting its legislation. Laws would have to be detailed in
order to limit the discretion excercised by executive agencies. In
turn, the General Assembly would be held more accountable for
the policies it promulgates. It would be much more difficult for the
General Assembly to pass on controversial issues to executive
agencies. The General Assembly would be forced to explain in
greater detail how policies should be implemented by the agencies.
VIII. Conclusion
The separation of powers doctrine is a fundamental principle
in Pennsylvania's governmental structure. Any possible encroach-
ment by the General Assembly upon the Executive Branch should
be viewed with great skepticism. Pennsylvania's Regulatory
Review Act allows the General Assembly to have an undue
influence over the Governor's duty to faithfully execute the law.
Although the Act may serve the legitimate purpose of reducing the
number of unwise regulations, it also creates the potential for the
"tyranny" of the legislative branch. The Pennsylvania Constitution
has procedural safeguards built into it to preserve the integrity of
the separation of powers doctrine. However, the current Act does
not require the General Assembly to follow the extensive proce-
dure set forth for the passage of a law. The Act should either be
abolished or amended to cure these constitutional deficiencies.
David Pascal Zambito
are appointed by the Speaker of the House. See 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5103 (1996).
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